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Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
It has now been forty years since Friday, Nov. 22, 1963, when President John F. 
Kennedy was assassinated and what is now known as the Great American Murder 
Mystery was born: Who was involved in the planning and execution of JFK's slaying, 
and why was it committed?  
The purpose of this article is to discuss the efforts Sen. Richard Russell undertook to 
help solve the greatest and most notorious crime committed in the United States in the 
20th century, and to show that Russell's grave concerns about the adequacy of the 
assassination's official investigation by the Warren Commission, the FBI, and the 
CIA, and about the accuracy of the Warren Report itself, have been fully 
vindicated.  Himself a member of the Warren Commission, Russell actions as a 
member soon led to his being labeled the Commission's "great dissenter;" and, 
because he was the first member to publicly criticize the Commission's work, he is 
also known as the Commission's "first dissenter."  
With the exception of Jimmy Carter, Richard B. Russell, Jr. (1897-1971) was the most 
distinguished Georgia politician of the 20th century.  Born in Winder, he graduated 
from the University of Georgia School of Law in 1918 at the age of 20.  Elected to the 
Georgia House of Representatives at the age of 23, he served there for ten years (the 
last four years as Speaker).  At the age of 34 he was elected Governor of Georgia, and 
less than two years later was elected to the U.S. Senate, serving there brilliantly in a 
leadership capacity for 38 years.  A conservative Democrat, Russell's support for 
segregation unfortunately led him to commit the greatest blunder of his illustrious 
career of public serviceâ€“masterminding the filibuster against the historic Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  
Russell never wanted to serve on the Warren Commission and was tricked into 
becoming a member.  On Nov. 29, 1963, one week after the assassination, the new 
president, Lyndon B. Johnson, an old friend, called Russell on the telephone and tried 
to persuade him to serve as a member of the commission (soon to be known as the 
Warren Commission because its chairman was to be Chief Justice Earl Warren) that 
LBJ was about to create to handle the assassination investigation.  Russell firmly 
declined.  Five hours later that same day, however, LBJ called back and told Russell 
that he had been appointed to the commission and that this had already been publicly 
announced.  "Learning that he ha[d] been outfoxed," historian Michael R. Beschloss 
writes, "Russell react[ed] with astonishment, indignation, then the weary resignation 
of one who has been dealing with LBJ for years."  It was thus by artifice and deceit 
that Russell was, as he put it in a letter written later, "conscripted on the 
Commission."  
Russell attended nearly all the Commission's executive sessions.  Because of his many 
other duties and obligations, Russell attended only 6% of the Commission hearings at 
which testimony was taken.  He did, however, with the help of an assistant, personally 
review the transcripts of the testimony, as well as other documents submitted to the 
Commission.  
While serving on the Warren Commission, Russell repeatedly voiced suspicions that 
the FBI had rushed to the judgment that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin and 
consequently was not thoroughly investigating the assassination and appropriately 
following up leads.  (The Commission did not have an independent staff of 
investigators; it relied on the FBI, the CIA, and other federal agencies to carry out 
investigative activities and to supply needed information.)  Russell's belief that the 
FBI was not performing adequately has been confirmed again and again since the 
Warren Report was released in 1964.  
In 1976 the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities investigated and 
issued a report on "the performance of intelligence agencies in conducting their 
investigation of the assassination and their relationships to the Warren 
Commission."  The report revealed that the Senate Committee "had developed 
evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at 
their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided 
information to the Warren Commission."  The report concluded that "both the CIA 
and the FBI failed in, or avoided carrying out, certain of their responsibilities in this 
matter....  The evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was 
deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the 
investigation were not provided the Warren Commission..."  The Senate Committee 
also found, in regard to the FBI specifically, that "during the Warren Commission 
investigation top FBI officials were continually concerned with protecting the 
Bureau's reputation and avoiding any criticism for not fulfilling investigative 
responsibilities....  The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation 
focused on Oswald, without conducting a broad investigation of the assassination 
which would have revealed any conspiracy, foreign or domestic."  
   
Three years later, in 1979, the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on 
Assassinations, after fully investigating the matter, issued a final report concluding 
that the FBI (1) "performed with varying degrees of competency," (2) "failed to 
investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President," and 
(3) "was deficient in its sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the 
assassination."  
While on the Commission, Russell repeatedly expressed doubts that the CIA could be 
trusted to provide the Commission with the full, unexpurgated truth.  These doubts 
have been fully vindicated.  The CIA did not, for example, inform the Commission of 
recent CIA-Mafia murder plots against Fidel Castro.  As noted above, in 1976 the 
Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that the CIA failed in, or avoided carrying 
out, certain of its responsibilities in investigating the assassination.  And the 1979 
report of the House Assassinations Committee concluded that the CIA "was deficient 
in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the 
assassination."  According to the 1979 report, "the CIA did not always respond to the 
Commission's broad request for all relevant material," and the responses the CIA did 
make were often tardy.  
Several books by responsible, knowledgeable scholars have detailed crucial 
information about Oswald which the CIA possessed before the assassination but 
refused to give to the Commission, including facts about CIA monitoring of Oswald's 
activities and his links to CIA agents.   Two of the best of these books are Philip H. 
Melanson, Spy Saga: Lee Harvey Oswald and U.S. Intelligence (1990), and John 
Newman, Oswald and the CIA (1995).  Reading these books leaves little doubt that 
Oswald had close connections with the CIA before Nov. 22, 1963 and that afterward 
the CIA, instead being forthright about its dealings with Oswald and its awareness of 
his activities, engaged in a coverup that impeded the investigation of the murder of an 
American president.  "What legal term should we use to describe the action of a 
government agency when it lies to a presidentially appointed investigation?" Newman 
scathingly asks.  
In a 1964 telephone conversation with LBJ shortly after the Warren Commission's last 
meeting, Russell expressed his unhappiness with what he called "[t]hat danged 
Warren Commission business."  In 1966 and again in 1970 Russell told the new media 
of his abiding dissatisfaction with the work of the Warren Commission.  Once again, 
Russell stands vindicated by history.  
Edward Jay Epstein's Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of 
Truth (1966), the best single treatise on the internal operations of the Commission, 
concluded that the Warren Commission, "sincerely convinced that the national interest 
would best be served by the termination of rumors, and predisposed by its make-up 
and by the pressure of time not to search more deeply, failed to answer some of the 
essential questions about the tragedy," and that the Warren Report "fails to contend 
with serious contradictions presented by the evidence."  The 1979 House 
Assassinations Committee in its final report concluded that (1) "the Warren 
Commission performed with varying degrees of competency," (2) "the Warren 
Commission failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to 
assassinate the President," (3) the Warren Commission "presented its conclusions in 
its report in a fashion that was too definitive," and (4) the Warren Report "was not, in 
some respects, an accurate presentation of the evidence available to the Commission 
... particularly on the issue of a possible conspiracy in the assassination."  
Further vindicating Russell, the House Assassinations Committee final report 
attributed the Warren Commission's failure to adequately investigate the possibility of 
conspiracy to, in part, "the failure of the Commission to receive all the relevant 
information that was in the possession of other agencies and departments of the 
Government [i.e., the FBI and the CIA]."  Russell's suspicions about the job the 
Warren Commission did were, therefore, well founded; in many respects the 
Commission's investigation was, as Henry Hurt charges in Reasonable Doubt: An 
Investigation into the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (1985), a "blue ribbon 
whitewash."  
Echoing sentiments he had previously expressed about the assassination, in a 1970 
television interview Russell said, "I have never believed that Oswald planned that 
altogether by himself.... [I] have doubts that he planned it all by himself.  I think 
someone else worked with him."  Russell's view that a conspiracy was, or may very 
well have been, behind the JFK assassination has also been proven to be 
correct.  Only a few diehard defenders of the Warren Report still seriously contend 
that Oswald, acting alone, was the sole assassin.  Today most reputable students of the 
assassination believe that there was a conspiracy (although they disagree on whether 
Oswald was one of the conspirators and on whether he fired any of the shots).  The 
final report of the House Assassinations Committee in 1979 concluded that "there was 
a high probability that two gunmen were firing at the President" and that "President 
John F. Kennedy was probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy."  (The final 
report concluded that at least fourâ€“and possibly as many as sixâ€“shots had been 
fired, including three from the vicinity of the School Book Depository Building 
behind the presidential limousine, and one from the grassy knoll to the right of the 
limousine; the Warren Report had concluded that only three shots were fired and that 
they all were fired by one person from the School Book Depository.)  And if there 
were two conspirators firing at the motorcade, doesn't it stand to reason that probably 
there were additional conspirators?  
Russell's strong suspicions regarding an actual or possible conspiracy may have been 
due in part to knowledge he had acquired as chair of a Senate subcommittee on CIA 
oversight.  As Russell biographer Gilbert C. Fite has written, Russell might have 
"possessed secret information others did not have, [and] he may have had reason to 
suspect some kind of conspiracy.  Whatever he knew, if anything, he carried to the 
grave."  
Russell adamantly opposed the Warren Commission's single bullet theoryâ€“the 
theory that a nonfatal bullet fired from behind struck JFK in the back, exited the front 
of his body, and struck Texas Gov. John B. Connally, causing all Connally's 
wounds.  Russell expressed his vehement disagreement with the single bullet theory in 
a proposed dissenting statement dictated on Sept. 16, 1964; he argued against the 
theory at the final meeting of the Commission on Sept. 18, 1964 (although the 
doctored transcript of this meeting contains no reference to Russell's arguments), and 
then criticized the single bullet theory again that very day in a telephone conversation 
with LBJ; and he emphatically rejected the theory in interviews with the press in 1966 
and 1970.  The two principal reasons Russell rejected the single bullet theory: (1) 
Connally's Warren Commission testimony, in which Connally absolutely, positively, 
and unequivocally asserted that before he was hit he heard a previous shot that struck 
JFK ("It's a certainty.  I'll never change my mind"), and (2) Russell's own examination 
of the Zapruder film.  (Two other of the seven members of Commission shared 
Russell's doubts about the single bullet theory; thus, nearly half the Commission 
questioned the theory.)  
The reason the Warren Commission embraced the single bullet theory is explained in 
Epstein's Inquest.  The famous Zapruder film of the assassination shows Connally 
reacting to his wounds about one-half second after JFK reacted to a (nonfatal) 
wound.  Using the Zapruder film it was also established that less than two seconds 
elapsed between the earliest time that JFK could have been shot and the latest time 
that Connally could have been shot.  "However," Epstein notes, "it was also 
established that the minimum time in which the [alleged] assassination weapon [a 
bolt-action carbine supposedly belonging to Oswald] could be fired twice was 2.3 
seconds...  Thus ... it was physically impossible for the assassination rifle to have been 
fired twice during the period when the President and Governor Connally were first 
wounded.  Either both men were hit by the same bullet, or there were two 
assassins."  Determined under all circumstances to find there was no conspiracy, the 
Commission was compelled to adopt the single bullet theory.  
During the last thirty years nearly all JFK assassination scholars who have studied the 
evidence, with the exception of a few gullible defenders of the Warren Report, have 
rejected the single bullet theory as little more than a ploy used by the Warren 
Commission to prop up its lone assassin theory.  The main reasons: (1) Connally's 
testimony (which was confirmed by his wife, who had been seated next to him in the 
presidential limousine); and (2) the contents of the Zapruder film.  Furthermore, as 
Robert J. Groden and Harrison Edward Livingstone point out in High Treasonâ€“The 
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: What Really Happened (1989): "Not a 
single witness to the shooting ever suggested that both men were hit at the same time, 
and in fact all the witnesses in Dealey Plaza who had anything to say about it 
indicated that the victims were hit by separate bullets."  Once again, Russell stands 
vindicated.  
Oddly, despite his rejection of the single bullet theory, Russell never seems to have 
questioned that Oswald fired all the shots that struck JFK and Connally.  He seems not 
have grasped the fact that without the theory there had to be more than one 
assassin.  In his Sept. 18, 1964 telephone conversation with LBJ, Russell said that his 
rejection of the single bullet theory "don't [sic] make much difference" and was "just a 
little thing."  Actually, of course, as Michael R. Beschloss has written, the repudiation 
of the theory would make "a world of difference.  For Kennedy and Connally to have 
been struck by separate bullets ... suggested that there may have been two gunmen 
firing at them in Dallas, and hence a conspiracy."  
In overview, Sen. Richard Russell played an important role on the Warren 
Commission, and the concerns he frequently voiced about the adequacy of the 
investigation carried out by the FBI and the CIA, as well as by the Warren 
Commission itself, have proved to be quite justified.  Despite his inability to devote 
much time to the Warren Commission, Russell labored to improve the quality of its 
investigation, to point out the bureaucratic pitfalls besetting the Commission, and to 
preserve its integrity.  If the entire Commission had shared Russell's admirable 
determination to get to the truth of the matter notwithstanding the strange and 
inexplicable investigative lapses of the FBI and the CIA, the Warren Commission's 
performance would certainly have been vastly improved, and the Warren Report 
would have been a different, more persuasive document.  But Russell was only one 
man, and there is only so much one man can do in the circumstances in which Russell 
found himself.  He did not solve America's crime of the century, and he could not 
have been expected to do so.  But it is to Sen. Richard Russell's lasting credit that he, 
more than other member of the Warren Commission, tried to slash through the 
constrictive coils that were suffocating the Warren Commission's endeavors to 
perform its solemn duty of uncovering the whole truth about America's greatest 
murder mystery.  Today the Warren Report is, in important respects, a justly 
discredited document, and one reason for this is that Sen. Richard Russell was the 
great as well as the first dissenter on the Warren Commission.  
Appendix A to this article is a timeline of events relating to Richard B. Russell's 
service on the Warren Commission, and Appendix B is a bibliography of writings 
dealing with Russell's criticisms of the Warren Report.  
 APPENDIX A  
SEN. RUSSELL AND THE JFK ASSASSINATION:  
A TIMELINE OF EVENTS  
Nov. 22, 1963 In broad daylight, while seated in an open limousine being driven in a 
motorcade to a luncheon, President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dealey Plaza 
in downtown Dallas, Texas.  The burst of hidden sniper fire that kills JFK also results 
in the severe but nonfatal wounding of Texas Governor John B. Connally, who is 
seated in the limousine in front of JFK.  At the time of the assassination, Sen. Richard 
Russell is an anteroom behind the U.S. Senate chamber, reading the wire feeds from 
the AP and UP news services.  
Nov. 24, 1963 Accused JFK assassin Lee Harvey Oswald is shot dead in a Dallas 
police station while in police custody and in the presence of numerous police officers 
by Jack Ruby, a local nightclub owner and organized crime figure.  
Nov. 29, 1963 Over Russell's objection, President Lyndon B. Johnson appoints 
Russell a member of the Warren Commission, which is to investigate and report on 
JFK assassination.  
Dec. 5, 1963 The Warren Commission meets in executive session.  At this, the first 
meeting of the Commission, Russell complains about  the FBI's leaking of 
information about the assassination to the press:  "I see occasionally in the press 
articles that purport to have come from the FBI as to bits of evidence and things of 
that kind.  How much of their findings does the FBI propose to release to the press 
before we present the findings of this Commission?"  (Russell appears to have 
believed that the FBI was leaking facts in order to make it impossible for the 
Commission to not accept those facts.)  During or after the meeting Russell writes a 
longhand memo saying: "Something strange is happening....  FBI ... and others [are] 
planning to show Oswald only one considered....  This to me is [an] untenable 
position."  
Dec. 16, 1963 At an executive session of the Warren Commission, Russell complains 
that the FBI report on the assassination, just submitted to the Commission, had 
previously been leaked to the press.  "I have read it through," Russell comments, "and 
practically everything in there has come out in the press at one time or another, a bit 
here and a bit there."  When discussing information required to be provided by the 
CIA, Russell says the other Commissioners have "more faith" in the CIA than he 
does.  Russell expresses doubt about whether the CIA would in fact 
provide  requested information and suggests that any information it did provide would 
be "doctored."  
Jan. 27, 1964 The Warren Commission meets in executive session to discuss various 
matters, including a credible allegation that Oswald had been a paid informer for the 
FBI.  The transcript of this meeting is first published by Warren Report critic Harold 
Weisberg in 1974.  At this meeting Russell, in the words of assassination researcher 
Bernard Fensterwald, "dr[aws] an admission from Allen Dulles [a member of the 
Warren Commission and former CIA director] that the CIA and/or FBI would never 
publicly admit that Oswald had worked for them, if that had indeed been 
true."  Russell also expresses support for the view that the FBI report's conclusion that 
Oswald, acting alone, was the sole assassin, had been reached with suspicious haste 
and on the basis of an incomplete investigation.  "They have tried the case and 
reached a verdict on every aspect," Russell says.  
Feb. 24, 1964 Russell prepares but never sends a letter resigning from the Warren 
Commission.  In the letter, addressed to President Johnson, Russell complains that the 
Commission has been scheduling, holding, and canceling meetings without notifying 
him.  
Sept. 6, 1964 At Russell's insistence, Russell and two other members of the 
Commission take testimony in Dallas, Texas from Marina Oswald, the widow of the 
accused assassin.  Marina Oswald had previously testified before the Commission on 
June 11 at a session at which Russell was absent.  Russell has insisted on having her 
testify again because he believes she has withheld vital information concerning Lee 
Harvey Oswald's mysterious contacts with Russian agents, Cuba, and Cuban 
Americans.  
Sept. 7, 1964 Russell and two other Warren Commission members visit Dealey Plaza 
and examine the assassination site.  While visiting the sixth floor room in the School 
Book Depository from which the assassin's shots were allegedly fired, Russell takes 
an unloaded rifle, leans out the window allegedly used by Oswald, and aims at the 
spot where JFK's limousine had been at the time of the assassination.  "Oswald must 
have been an expert shot," he says.  A photograph of Russell leaning out the window, 
rifle in hand, soon appears in newspapers.  
Sept. 16, 1964 Russell dictates a dissenting statement disagreeing with the Warren 
Report single bullet theory that JFK and Connally were hit by the same bullet: "I do 
not share the finding of the Commission as to the probability that both President 
Kennedy and Governor Connally were struck by the same bullet....  I join in my 
colleagues in the belief that three shots were fired, but, to me, the testimony of 
Governor Connally that he heard the first shot fired and strike the President and turned 
before he was wounded makes more logical a finding that the first and third shots 
struck the President and the second shot wounded Governor Connally."  The 
dissenting statement also disagrees with the Report's conclusion of no conspiracy.  In 
Russell's judgment, "a number of suspicious circumstances," as well as the 
insufficiency of the evidence gathered against Oswald, "preclude[d] the conclusive 
determination that Oswald and Oswald alone, without the knowledge, encouragement 
or assistance of any other person, planned and perpetrated the 
assassination."  Apparently with Russell's consent, this dissenting statement is never 
incorporated into the Warren Report.  
Sept. 18, 1964 The Warren Commission meets in executive session.  At this, the final 
meeting of the Commission, the proposed final draft of the Warren Report is 
presented and discussed, and Russell raises his objections to the single bullet theory 
and to the no conspiracy theory.  None of this, however, appears on the transcript of 
the meeting.  Unlike all the other transcripts of Warren Commission proceedings, the 
transcript of this meeting is not a verbatim transcript; instead, except for the first page, 
it consists of a series of conclusory paragraphs which tell us little more than that 
"discussion was had" regarding the proposed Warren Report, and that certain motions 
were made and approved by Commission members.  (This transcript is, as Harold 
Weisberg has proved beyond doubt, a fake.  Even the pagination, which purports to 
make the transcript a continuation of previous, authentic (and verbatim) transcripts, is 
phony.  It is not known who falsified the transcript, or when it was prepared.  The 
fabricating of the transcript appears to have been done to assure that there would be 
no actual minutes of the criticisms leveled at the proposed Report by Russell and 
others at the meeting.)  After the meeting, Russell has a long distance telephone 
conversation with LBJ.  The tape recording of this call is not released to the public 
until Apr. 15, 1994.  During the conversation Russell reiterates what he had  said at 
today's Commission meeting and had set forth in his dissenting statement two days 
before: he could not accept the single bullet theory.  "They're trying to prove that the 
same bullet that hit Kennedy first was the one that hit Connally, went through him and 
through his hand, his bone, and into his leg," Russell tells LBJ. "Well, I don't believe 
it!" he then tells LBJ (who quickly responds: "Well, I don't either!") Apparently not 
fully appreciating the significance of rejecting the single bullet theory, Russell says 
that his rejection of the theory "don't [sic] make much difference" and is "just a little 
thing.".  
Sept. 24, 1964 Russell and the other members of the Warren Commission go to the 
White House and personally deliver the Warren Report to LBJ.  
Sept. 27, 1964 The Warren Report is officially released to the public.  The Report's 
principal conclusions include: (1) All the shots which struck JFK and Connally were 
fired in less than eight seconds from the sixth floor of the School Book Depository by 
Lee Harvey Oswald using a military surplus bolt-action 6.5 mm carbine manufactured 
in Italy in 1940; (2) Oswald fired three shots; (3) "there is very persuasive evidence" 
that one of the bullets fired from behind the limousine transected JFK's body 
(inflicting a nonlethal injury) and then struck Connally, causing all his wounds; (4) 
Oswald acted alone and there was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic, behind the 
assassination; and (5) there was no credible evidence that shots were fired from any 
location except the sixth floor of the Depository.  
Sept. 29, 1964 In an article in The Atlanta Constitution, Russell announces that 
(despite the claim of no conspiracy made in the Warren Report released only two days 
earlier) it is unknown whether Oswald acted "with the encouragement or knowledge 
of anyone else."  Russell thus becomes the first Warren Commission member to 
publicly express a view on the assassination contrary to the Warren Report.  
Nov. 20, 1966 In an article in The Atlanta Constitution which describes him as "the 
great dissenter within the Commission," Russell becomes the first Warren 
Commission member to publicly criticize the Warren Report.  He acknowledges 
"harbor[ing] a lingering dissatisfaction with [the Warren Commission's] work."  He 
reveals that at the time the Report was issued he disagreed with its single bullet 
theory.  He firmly states that he could not agree with the Warren Report's conclusion 
that Oswald acted alone.  He adds that while he could accept the conclusion that 
Oswald fired the shots that killed JFK, he could not rule out the possibility that 
Oswald was part of a conspiracy.  In the article Russell also says that he had wanted 
the Warren Report to say nothing about whether there was a conspiracy behind the 
assassination.  
   
June 5, 1968 Russell has a chance encounter with Harold Weisberg in the U.S. 
Capitol.  Weisberg informs Russell that the transcript of the Sept. 18, 1964 meeting of 
the Warren Commission is a bogus document.  As the two walk through a corridor, 
Russell tells Weisberg that "we have not been told the truth about Oswald."  Other 
things Russell said on this occasion are recounted in a federal court affidavit sworn to 
by Weisberg in 1974: "Privately Senator Russell told me that he was convinced that 
there were two areas in which Warren Commission members had been deceived by 
the Federal agencies responsible for investigating the assassination of President 
Kennedy.  These two areas were: (1) Oswald's background; and (2) the ballistics 
evidence."  
June 14, 1968 One of his aides who has checked into the matter sends Russell a 
memo stating that the apparent falsification of the Sept. 18, 1964  transcript "would 
appear to be a very serious matter."  
Jan. 30, 1970 In his final letter to Harold Weisberg, Russell writes: "I am interested 
that you are continuing your work, and there are a number of matters in the 
investigation which would be of interest to me if I had the time to devote to them."  
   
Feb. 11, 1970 Atlanta station WSB-TV televises reporter Hal Suit's interview of 
Russell.  During a small portion of this 3-hour documentary broadcast, "Richard 
Russell: Georgia Giant," Russell discusses the Warren Commission and its Report.  "I 
was not satisfied with several aspects of [the Warren] [R]eport," he says.  Concerning 
Oswald and the possibility of a conspiracy in the JFK assassination, Russell says: "I 
have never believed that Oswald planned that altogether by himself.... [I] have doubts 
that he planned it all by himself.  I think someone else worked with him.... [T]here 
were so many circumstances there that led me to believe that you couldn't just 
completely eliminate the possibility that he did have some co-conspirators....  I'm not 
completely satisfied in my own mind that he did plan and commit this act altogether 
on his own, without consultation with anyone else.  And that's what a majority of the 
Commission wanted to find."  During the interview Russell also professes not to have 
"the slightest doubt" that Oswald had fired the fatal shots.  
Jan. 21, 1971 Russell dies of lung cancer at Walter Reed Hospital in Washington, 
D.C. 
 
APPENDIX B  
WRITINGS ON SEN. RUSSELL AND THE WARREN COMMISSION  
Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth 
(1966).  This scholarly book examines the inner workings of the Warren Commission 
and concludes that "the Commission, sincerely convinced that the national interest 
required dispelling rumors and conspiracy theories, failed to adequately investigate 
the essential questions about the JFK assassination."  The book explores Russell's role 
on the Commission with emphasis on his opposition to the single bullet theory.  
Harold Weisberg, Whitewash IV: Top Secret JFK Assassination Transcript 
(1974).  The author of this book (now deceased) was one of the leading authorities on 
the JFK assassination, and after extensive investigation and research wrote nine books 
on the topic.  This remarkable book is the first publication to set forth the text of the 
previously classified transcript of the Jan. 27, 1964 executive session of the Warren 
Commission.   The book also conclusively proves that the transcript of the final 
meeting of the Warren Commission (on Sept. 18, 1964) is a fabrication.  The 
preparation of the false transcript was likely done by J. Lee Rankin, the Commission's 
General Counsel, the author suggests.  
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Coincidence or Conspiracy? (1977).  This book, edited by 
an attorney who has extensively investigated the JFK assassination, includes a section 
setting forth numerous facts showing that, in the words of the editor, "Senator Russell 
was deeply disturbed by the performance of the Warren Commission, and even more 
deeply disturbed by the denial of certain information to it by both the CIA and the 
FBI."  This book also examines the fabricated transcript of the Sept. 18, 1964 Warren 
Commission meeting and proposes that J. Lee Rankin "may have been responsible" 
for the falsifying of the transcript.  
Henry Hurt, Reasonable Doubt: An Investigation into the Assassination of John F. 
Kennedy (1985).  This book quotes statements about the JFK assassination 
investigation made by Russell made at Warren Commission executive sessions and in 
press interviews.  This book points out that in his 1970 television interview Russell 
"confirmed the long-standing suspicion that a majority of the [C]ommission members 
wanted to show that Oswald acted alone."  
Robert J. Groden and Harrison Edward Livingstone, High Treasonâ€“The 
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: What Really Happened (1989).  This 
book briefly discusses Russell's refusal to accept the single bullet theory and his 
rejection of the no conspiracy theory.  
Gary Diamond, Richard Russell's Opinions Concerning the Kennedy Assassination: 
An Examination of the Richard B. Russell Memorial Library (May 5, 1989).  This 
unpublished research paper by a UGA law student summarizes Russell's work on the 
Warren Commission and is based on an thorough examination of Russell Collection 
documents in the UGA's Richard B. Russell Library, many of which are quoted or 
copied in the paper.  
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Russell Disagreed With JFK Death Report, The Athens 
Observer, p. 1 (Nov. 9, 1989).  This article discusses Russell Collection 
documents  showing that Russell had grave doubts about key aspects of the Warren 
Report and that Russell prepared but never sent a letter resigning from the Warren 
Commission.  
Gilbert C. Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator From Georgia (1991).  Fite, a history 
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